We study the effect of the second Intifada, a violent conflict between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors which erupted in September 2000, and the ensuing riots of Arab citizens of Israel, on labor market outcomes of Arabs relative to those of Jewish Israelis. The analysis relies on a large matched employer-employee dataset, focusing on firms that in the pre-Intifada period hired both Arabs and Jews. Our analysis demonstrates that until September 2000 Arab workers had a lower rate of job separation than their Jewish peers and that this differential was significantly reduced after the outbreak of the Intifada. We argue that the most likely explanation for this pattern is increased anti-Arab discrimination among Jews. JEL classification codes: H56, J15, J63, J71
Introduction
On September The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of the second Intifada and the "October Events" on labor market outcomes of Israeli Arabs. Our main hypothesis is that the deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations brought about by these events damaged the position of Arabs in the Israeli labor market, and more specifically, led to a relative increase in their rates of (involuntary) job separation. To test this hypothesis we examine a large matched employeremployee dataset, focusing on private sector firms which in the pre-Intifada period hired both Arabs and Jews.
Several studies (e.g. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) , Zussman and Zussman (2006) , and Zussman, Zussman, and Nielsen (2008) ) have documented the severe negative macroeconomic effect the Intifada had on the Israeli economy. Previous research (e.g. Freeman, 1973) has shown that ethnic minorities may be the "last hired and first fired" over the business cycle. Although to date such a pattern has not been documented in Israeli data this still raises the challenge of distinguishing between our hypothesis and the potential effect of the economic downturn. We therefore focus our analysis on an eighteen month window (January 2000 --June 2001) centered around the outbreak of the Intifada, during which the aggregate unemployment rate was stable.
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4 Nevertheless, to the extent that employers anticipated an economic downturn following the start of violence, we cannot fully distinguish between the alternative explanations.
Our analysis demonstrates that in the pre-Intifada period Arabs had a five percentage points lower chance of job separation than their Jewish peers and that this differential was narrowed down by close to a half after the outbreak of the Intifada. The Intifada's effect was persistent, spread across economic sectors and geographic areas, and was not influenced by escalations in violence between Israel and the Palestinians. The data suggest that the most likely explanation for the results is heightened anti-Arab discrimination among Jews.
The analysis conducted in this paper is most closely related to two existing lines of research in the literature. The first investigates the position of Arabs in the Israeli labor market while the other attempts to detect, in countries other than Israel, a connection between conflict and labor market outcomes. Asali (2006) used data from income surveys conducted between 1990 to 2003 to measure wage differentials between Arab and Jewish workers. He found that the wage gap increased sharply from 1990 to 1999 but decreased markedly afterwards. Asali argued that the rise in the wage gap during the 1990s was most plausibly related to the mass immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union. The decline in the second part of the period, the author conjectured, may have been related to the outbreak of the second Intifada, after which the number of Palestinians working in Israel was sharply reduced, raising the demand for Arab-Israeli labor. 5 Asali's results echo a finding in an earlier study by Haberfeld and Cohen (1996) which covered the period 1987-1993. Haberfeld and Cohen found that relative to Eastern (Sephardi) Jews, Arab-Israelis were successful in narrowing the earnings gap with Western (Ashkenazi) Jews. They argued that the finding was probably related to the sharp decrease in employment of Palestinians in Israel during the first Intifada (which broke out in 1987).
Several differences between these earlier studies and ours are worth emphasizing. First, our analysis focuses on firms which in the pre-Intifada period hired both Arabs and Jews while the previous studies did not differentiate between integrated and segregated workplaces. Second, the earlier papers have examined wage data while we examine patterns of job separation. Third, 5 Miaari and Sauer (2006) documented the sharp decline in Palestinian employment in Israel following the outbreak of the Intifada.
while the previous studies find that the first and second Intifadas improved the position of Arabs in the Israeli labor market we come to an opposite conclusion. Fourth, our study deals directly with the differential effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the rising Arab-Jewish tensions on the relative position of Arabs in the Israeli labor market. Fifth, the current analysis relies on a much more detailed data source, at the firm level. 6 Two recent studies examined the effect of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9-11) on labor market outcomes in the United States. Davila and Mora (2005) used data from the American Community Survey and found that Middle Eastern Arab men (and men from other groups most closely associated with the ethnicity of the 9-11 terrorists) experienced significant earnings declines relative to non-Hispanic whites between 2000 and 2002. The authors demonstrated that this finding is not explained by changes in the structure of wages or in observable characteristics beyond ethnicity. Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2007) found, using data from the Current Population Surveys from September 1997 to September 2005, that the attacks did not significantly affect the employment of first-and second-generation Arab and Muslim men in the United States, but was associated with a 10 percent decline in their real hourly wage and weekly earnings.
Several other papers have examined the effect of terrorist attacks on labor markets in Europe. Aslund and Rooth (2005) investigated the effect of 9-11 on the Swedish labor market.
Their examination of unemployment exits and entries around 9-11 found no sign of increased discrimination toward minorities. Braakmann (2007a) found that the 9-11 attacks had no effect on the re-employment prospects of unemployed Arabs in Germany. In another study Braakmann (2007b) found that employment probabilities, hours worked, and real wages of Arab men in England were unchanged following the 9-11 attacks, the Madrid train bombings in March 2004, and the London bombings in July 2005. Thus it is seems fair to conclude that the terrorist attacks of the last decade did not have significant labor market outcomes on relevant minorities in Europe.
Our study shares to some degree the theme of "conflict and discrimination" with the last group of studies discussed above, but at the same time the focus on Israel may give our analysis an advantage. The intensity of the ethnic tensions are by far more pronounced in Israel postSeptember 2000 than in England, Germany, Sweden and the U.S. post 9-11.
7 Moreover, our analysis is based on very detailed data at the firm level. Finally, ours is the only study to examine patterns of job separation.
Although we focus on a specific conflict, the results may be relevant in other contexts because the interaction between external and internal conflicts, especially ethnic and religious ones, is a prominent feature of world politics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief background on Arab-Jewish relations in Israel, focusing on the role of the Intifada as a turning point. The structure of the data and methodological issues are discussed in Section 3. In section 4 we present the empirical results. Section 5 deals with the extent to which our main result --the relative increase in the job separation rate of Arabs after the outbreak of the Intifada --can be attributed to increased anti-Arab discrimination among Jews. In section 6 we summarize the findings and offer concluding remarks.
Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel
Israeli Arabs comprise around 20 percent of Israel's population, numbering over one In summary, there seems to be a consensus that the outbreak of the Intifada has led to deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. There is reason to believe that this phenomenon did not manifest itself solely in the political arena but also changed the economic relationship between the two groups. We focus our analysis on Arab-Jewish relations in the labor market.
Data and Methodology
The main source of labor market information that we use is a matched employer-employee dataset for the period January 2000 to June 2001. This monthly dataset, produced by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), contains several fields for each employer, including economic sector, location, and number of employees.
The matched employer-employee dataset also contains several fields for each employee, such as annual nominal gross wage and starting date of employment. Using the employees' national identification numbers, the CBS was able to link their records to the population registry, allowing us to obtain information on variables such as gender, age, marital status, number of children, country of birth, year of immigration, and place of residence. Importantly, we can identify each employee's ethnicity.
The matched employer-employee dataset covers all Israeli employers. We exclude from our analysis employers in the public sector because the scope for differential treatment of Arabs and Jews (within the same workplace) in it is negligible due to the following reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of Arab public sector workers are employed in education and health services which are almost completely ethnically segregated --Arabs work in Arab communities and Jews work in Jewish communities. Second, the enforcement of equal employment rights laws is relatively rigorous in the public sector. Third, public sector workers tend to be unionized and to hold tenured jobs and are thus not as likely to be discharged as their private sector peers.
The private sector matched employer-employee dataset we were left with was practically too large to handle. We therefore had to restrict the analysis to a subset of employers based on three criteria: the share of Arab employees in each economic branch (sector), the overall number of employees in that sector, and the size of the employer. We exclude sectors in which the share of Arab employees is miniscule: electricity, water, transportation 10 , and communication. In contrast, we include all the employers in agriculture and construction, since in both sectors the share of Arab employees is high. In the other sectors --manufacturing, commerce, and various 10 Excluding the ground transportation sub-sector which has a large proportion of Arab employees.
services --we divide all employers to groups based on the number of employees: 1-10, 11-50, 51-100, and more than 100. We include in our dataset all the employers in the first and second groups but progressively limit our coverage (based on a representative sample) in the third and fourth groups. 11 Thus our dataset is made up of the entire population of employers in some sectors and a representative sample of employers in the other sectors.
We restrict the analysis to employees who were 18 to 54 years old in 2000. Excluding old workers from the analysis helps us to circumvent problems associated with early retirement.
Since we want to examine differences in labor market outcomes for Arabs and Jews we focus our investigation on integrated firms, i.e. firms that employed both Arabs and Jews. In order to capture the effect of the Intifada our analysis tracks workers who started their employment in integrated firms in the pre-Intifada period (January to September 2000).
Examining only workers that started their employment during that period, rather than all existing workers, avoids the stock sampling bias. On the eve of the Intifada, in September 2000, our dataset contains 228,295 jobs (22 percent of which are of Arabs) in 11,179 firms.
The matched employer-employee dataset offers some advantages relative to other sources of data. Probably the main advantage is that by examining data at the firm level we are better able to identify and understand the sources of Arab-Jewish differences in job separation patterns.
A nationwide Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate could have several explanations.
Among them are changes in the demand for labor in different sectors which employ varying proportions of Arabs and Jews. Controlling for changes in demand between sectors is not enough, however. One needs firm level data in order to take into account changes in demand within the same sector. For example, rising tensions may lead to a decline in tourism in some cities (e.g. Jerusalem) but leave other tourist destinations (e.g. Eilat, on the coast of the Red Sea) relatively unaffected. By examining data at the firm level we can readily confront such confounding factors.
12 11 Details are available upon request.
12 An added benefit of using firm level data is that it makes it unlikely that our results are influenced by seasonality.
A major weakness of the matched employer-employee dataset is that it does not tell us whether the job separation is voluntary or involuntary. As we show in Section 5, however, the richness of the data allows us to narrow the investigation down to those cases that most likely involved involuntary separation. Another weakness of the dataset --which is common to administrative datasets --is that it does not include information about the occupation of the employee. Such information could have been very useful in detecting discrimination and ascertaining its type (e.g. customer discrimination). This problem is mitigated by the fact that we know the employee's wage rate, which captures to some extent her occupation, education, and seniority.
Our analysis also relies on labor force surveys conducted by the CBS. These are rotating quarterly panels where households are surveyed four times over six quarters: they are surveyed for two consecutive quarters, not surveyed in the next two quarters, and then surveyed again for two consecutive quarters (the surveys cover slightly more than 20,000 individuals aged 15 or older in each quarter). This dataset assists us in tracking aggregate fluctuations in the labor market.
A natural question to examine is whether the intensity of violence during the Intifada affected the job separation rates of Jews and Arabs. In order to do so we collected data on In order to identify whether the outbreak of the Intifada, the intensity of violence, and other factors had a differential effect on the patterns of job separation of Arabs and Jews we apply a standard survival analysis using a linear probability model. 13 We follow workers from the month they enter a specific firm until they are separated from that firm or until June 2001 (the censoring 13 See Allison (1995) . month). 14 Thus the dependent variable in the regressions is the employment status of the worker in the firm in a given month. The set of explanatory variables includes individual and firm characteristics and variables that capture the outbreak of the Intifada and its intensity. 
Main regression results
We now turn to an econometric analysis of the Intifada's effect on job separation rates among Arabs and Jews. Table 1 Turning to the focus of our examination, we find that before the outbreak of the Intifada Arabs had a 3 to 5 percentage points lower chance of being separated from their employers than Jews (this fact has been demonstrated graphically in Figure 4 ). The Intifada itself led to an increase in the job separation rates of both Arabs and Jews. However, the increase in the job separation rate was not uniform: it was between 1 to 2 percentage points higher for Arabs than for Jews. Thus the results suggest that while the Intifada did not completely eliminate the ArabJewish difference in job separation rates, it narrowed it down considerably. Since we are interested in understanding the dynamics of job separation within each firm, from this point on we use the specification of column 2 as our baseline model.
How did the Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate evolve during the Intifada period?
In order to examine this question we estimate the baseline model while replacing the Intifada indicator variable with a set of month dummies for the Intifada period, and the interaction term between the Intifada and Arab variables with a set of interaction terms between the month dummies and the Arab variable. Figure 5 shows that the increase in the Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate, relative to the pre-Intifada period, was significant for all months from October 2000 to June 2001 and did not decline by much over time. 15 The evidence thus suggests the Intifada had a persistent effect. How did changes in the intensity of violence during the conflict with the Palestinians affect the job separation rates of Arabs and Jews? Table 3 demonstrates that the contemporaneous and lagged values of monthly Israeli fatalities are all associated with increased job separation rates but also that this effect is almost uniform for Jewish and Arab workers. The strongest effects are estimated for the lags; this likely reflects frictions in the process of job separation. The results presented in Table 3 imply that the outbreak of the Intifada and the "October Events" led to a large discrete increase in the differential job separation rate and that this differential was not influenced by the fluctuating intensity of violence.
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Lastly, we examine two geographical aspects of the conflict's effects. We term the towns in which clashes between Arabs and the police occurred as "October Events" towns and the areas around them as "October Events" areas. 17 Many integrated firms operate in these areas which are characterized by close proximity of Arab, Jewish and integrated towns. One may suspect that the "October Events" had an especially large effect on firms and workers in these areas. The results presented in Table 4 show that the Intifada's effect on the Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate was practically identical for workers employed in firms located in the "October Events"
15 The pre-Intifada Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate is -4.86 percentage points (standard error=0.34 percentage points). 16 Our analysis implicitly assumes that Palestinian violence toward Israelis leads to increased animosity of Jews toward Arabs which in turn affects labor market outcomes. In this respect the analysis could have benefitted from using direct measures of animosity rather than fatality figures. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge measures of animosity (e.g. from public opinion polls) are not unavailable at regular frequencies. 17 The "October events" towns are: Acre, Araaba, Deir al-Asad, Ein Mahel, Jisr az-Zarqa, Kafar Kanna, Kfar Manda, Kfar Yasif, Majd al-Krum, Nazareth, Reineh, Sakhnin, Shefa-'Amr, Tamra, Turaan, Umm al-Fahm, and Yafi'a. The (natural) areas these towns are located in are the Acre area, the Alexander Mountain area (Wadi Ara area, northern Triangle), the Carmel coast area, the Carmiel area, the Hadera area (southern Triangle), the Nazareth mountains --Turaan area, and the Shefa-'Amr area.
areas and for workers employed elsewhere (column 1). A somewhat stronger effect, but still a statistically insignificant one, was estimated for Arab employees from "October Events" towns (column 2).
Another special set of firms and workers are those associated with integrated towns, which are predominantly Jewish towns with a sizeable Arab minority. 18 In these towns Arabs and Jews have lived together for years, in some cases for many generations. The results presented in column 3 of Table 4 show that the Intifada's effect on the Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate was, as expected, lower for workers employed in firms located in integrated towns than for workers employed elsewhere but this difference is not statistically significant. We also find an insignificant difference for workers from integrated towns relative to workers from other towns (column 4). The results presented in Table 4 thus suggest that the differential effect of the Intifada on the job separation rates of Arabs and Jews tended to be geographically diffused.
Discrimination?
The findings presented in the previous section are open for several interpretations.
Probably the most plausible one seems to be that the results are due to a widening anti-Arab The seminal work of Becker (1957) has spawned an enormous literature on the economics 18 The integrated towns are: Acre, Haifa, Lod, Maalot-Tarshiha, Ramle, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, and Upper Nazareth. Note that Jerusalem, the city with the largest overall Arab population, is a special case since its Arab inhabitants (concentrated in the eastern part of the city) became permanent residents of Israel only after the 1967 war. The Arabs of East Jerusalem keep strong ties with the Palestinian population of the West Bank. We therefore exclude Jerusalem from the analysis of integrated towns.
of discrimination. 19 From the perspective of this literature it is interesting to note that our study offers a relatively rare examination of the interaction between ethnic groups at the margin, in that we focus on firms in which Arab employees interact with Jewish co-workers and employers.
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As Heckman (1998) emphasizes "The impact of market discrimination is not determined by the most discriminatory participants in the market, or even by the average level of discrimination among firms, but rather by the level of discrimination at the firms where ethnic minorities or women actually end up buying, working and borrowing. It is at the margin that economic values are set."
21
There are two main branches in the economics of discrimination literature. The first, due to Becker (1957) , deals with taste based discrimination, or personal prejudice, among employers, fellow employees, or customers who dislike associating with workers of a given sex, race, or ethnicity. The second branch, due to Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) , deals with statistical discrimination. This literature focuses on hiring decisions and essentially argues that employers have limited information about the skills of job applicants and therefore use observable characteristics of applicants, such as ethnicity, to infer their expected productivity.
Since we examine job separations, which are situations where the employer likely already knows the productivity of the workers, it seems that taste-based discrimination is the more relevant type of discrimination to consider. This conclusion seems even more warranted considering the evidence provided in section 2 which demonstrated that the outbreak of the Intifada and the "October Events" increased anti-Arab sentiment among Jewish Israelis.
22 19 The literature on labor market discrimination is reviewed by Altonji and Blank (1999) . 20 Our data do not identify the ethnic identities of the owners or managers of the integrated firms. However, the data do tell us that throughout the period examined the share of integrated firms located in Arab towns and villages --where the likelihood of Arab ownership and management is relatively high --was less than five percent. Moreover, consultations with leading Israeli non-governmental organizations which focus their efforts on advancing the equality between Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel lead us to believe that almost all integrated firms in the country operate under Jewish ownership and management. Thus our working assumption will be that Jews own and manage the integrated firms analyzed here.
21 Charles and Guryan (2008) have recently re-emphasized the importance of marginal considerations in the analysis of discrimination. 22 In a similar vein Moser (forthcoming) uses data from opera programs, census records on first names, and food purchases in the United States to argue that WWI created a preference shock against German Americans. Moser uses this shock to ethnic preferences to identify the effects of taste-based discrimination in the applications for seats We first examine the possibility of voluntary separations. Table 5 presents the results of estimating our baseline model with increasingly more restrictive samples. In the first column we use the entire sample as a benchmark for comparison. In the second column (Restriction 1) we exclude from the analysis cases of bankruptcy. 23 Although these are cases of involuntary separation they are not directly related to the question of discrimination. In the third column (Restriction 2) we exclude, on top of the bankruptcy cases, those cases in which the employee held a parallel job to the job he was separated from and those cases in which the employee immediately (within a month) found an alternative job. By using this restriction we focus the analysis on cases that are more likely to be associated with involuntary separations. As we move to the right in Table 5 the effect of the Intifada on Jewish workers weakens: from about five percent in column 1 to roughly one percent in column 3. In contrast, the Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate, for both the pre-Intifada period and the Intifada period, is stable throughout.
Thus the evidence seems to be inconsistent with the voluntary separations hypothesis.
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We next investigate the hypothesis that the Intifada led to reduced work effort among Arab employees, which in turn led to them being laid off. The matched employer-employee dataset does not allow estimation of employees' productivity. However, the labor force surveys contain on the New York Stock Exchange: the War more than doubled the probability that German applicants would be rejected (relative to Anglo-Saxons).
23 Bankruptcy is defined as those cases in which the number of employees in the firm falls down to zero. 24 Labor force surveys provide further (indirect) support for this conclusion as they show that the quitting rate of Arabs is significantly lower than that of Jews (7 percent for Arabs and 19 percent for Jews during the period under investigation).
information about absenteeism, which is an (admittedly crude) indication of work effort.
According to the labor force surveys in the pre-Intifada period (first three quarters of 2000) the average absenteeism rate was 6.0 percent among Arabs and 7.0 percent among Jews. In the Intifada period (the following three quarters) the corresponding figures were 4.2 and 6.2 percent.
Thus the evidence also seems to be inconsistent with the reduced work effort hypothesis.
We believe that taken as a whole the evidence suggests (but does not conclusively establish) that the most plausible explanation for the increase in the Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate after the outbreak of the Intifada was heightened (taste-based) anti-Arab discrimination among Jews. In fact, one may argue that our analysis understates the effect of the Intifada-induced rise in anti-Arab discrimination on the labor market: by focusing on (what seem to be mostly) layoff decisions we ignored the hiring decisions of Jewish owners and managers which were likely influenced by the conflict. We leave the analysis of this question for future research.
Conclusion
This study examined the effects of the second Intifada, a violent conflict between Israel and Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the ensuing riots of Arab citizens of Israel, on labor market outcomes of Arabs relative to those of Jewish Israelis. Our analysis focused on private sector firms that in the pre-Intifada period hired both Arabs and Jews.
Using a comprehensive matched employer-employee dataset we demonstrated that in the preIntifada period Arabs had a five percentage points lower chance of job separation than their Jewish peers and that this differential was narrowed down by close to a half after the outbreak of the Intifada. The effect of the Intifada was persistent, spread across economic sectors and geographic areas, and was not influenced by escalations in violence between Israel and the Palestinians.
Although our findings are open for several interpretations, we believe that taken as a whole the evidence presented in this study indicate that the most plausible explanation for the increase in the Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate after the outbreak of the Intifada was heightened anti-Arab discrimination among Jews.
Our study contributes to the literature on the relationship between ethnic conflict and labor market outcomes. Although we focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, our results are likely be relevant in other contexts since ethnic and religious tensions characterize many countries around the world and since many international conflicts involve situations were sub-groups in the populations of the belligerent states share strong cross-border ethnic and religious ties. In such circumstances the potential for an interaction between internal tensions and external conflict to influence labor market outcomes always exists. (1) is manufacturing. The regressions include a constant (not reported) and were estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firms) are in parentheses. The symbols *,**, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. (2) of Table 1 . All coefficients and standard errors were multiplied by 100 for ease of exposition. The regressions were estimated by ordinary least squares with firm fixed effects. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firms) are in parentheses. The symbols * , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (matched employer-employee dataset) and authors' calculations. and includes all workers who started their employment in integrated (Arab-Jewish) firms from January to September 2000. The "October Events" towns are: Acre, Araaba, Deir al-Asaf, Ein Mahel, Jisr az-Zarqa, Kafar Kanna, Kfar Manda, Kfar Yasif, Majd al-Krum, Nazareth, Reineh, Sakhnin, Shefa-'Amr, Tamra, Turaan, Umm al-Fahm, and Yafi'a. The (natural) areas these towns are located in are the Acre area, the Alexander Mountain area (Wadi Ara area, northern Triangle), the Carmel coast area, the Carmiel area, the Hadera area (southern Triangle), the Nazareth mountains --Turaan area, and the Shefa-'Amr area. The integrated towns are: Acre, Haifa, Lod, Maalot-Tarshiha, Ramle, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, and Upper Nazareth. All coefficients and standard errors were multiplied by 100 for ease of exposition. The regressions were estimated by ordinary least squares with firm fixed effects. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firms) are in parentheses. The symbols * , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (matched employer-employee dataset) and authors' calculations. Table 1 , column 2. "Restriction 1" -excludes from the analysis cases of bankruptcy. "Restriction 2" -excludes bankruptcy cases and those in which the employee held a parallel job to the job he was separated from and cases in which the employee immediately (within a month) found an alternative job. All coefficients and standard errors were multiplied by 100 for ease of exposition. The regressions were estimated by ordinary least squares with firm fixed effects. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firms) are in parentheses. The symbols * , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. , and a set of interaction terms between the Arab indicator variable and the month indicator variables ; the figure plots the set of interaction terms together with their 95% confidence intervals; the pre-Intifada Arab-Jewish differential job separation rate is -4.86% (standard error=0.34%).
